The character of his Realism has … Expand. The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the political realism of Hans J. The article traces the development of his thought from his earliest writings on social science and politics … Expand. Freudian roots of political realism: the importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J.
Morgenthau's theory of international power politics. The article unveils the intellectual indebtedness of Hans J. Morgenthau's realist theory of international power politics to Freudian meta- and group psychology. It examines an unpublished Morgenthau … Expand. Strategy as a vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and modern strategic studies.
Few books or articles are cited a decade, let alone a generation, after they are written. When scholars die, their ideas often die with them, although … Expand. Through this it sheds light on the forceful claims to … Expand. Miami University. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Select Format Select format. Permissions Icon Permissions. Article PDF first page preview. Issue Section:. You do not currently have access to this article. Download all slides. Sign in Don't already have an Oxford Academic account?
You could not be signed in. Sign In Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution Sign in. A book such as this C;;tIl picture the disease but Cl;I. More especially, it must leave the production of 'neat and rational solutions to those who believe in the philosophy against which this book is written. It must deprive the re;:l. In the last analysis, tnereeXiSts aTuilc1amentalldentity between the human mind and the laws which govern the world; one and the same reason reigns over both.
It is this identity which enables man to understand the causes of events and, by creating causes through his reasonable action, to make himself the master of events. This neW belief in the creative power of reason grew out of the experiences which, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had awakened and, with each new experience, strengthened the confidence of the human mind in itself. It was in the field of physical nature that these experiences occurred.
The great geographical discoveries and the new insights of Copernicus, Bruno, Kopler, and Galilee stand out as landmarks; in Francis Bacon they find their philosophical manifestation.
The seventeenth century saw in the works of Descartes and Newton, of Leibnitz and Vico the crowning achievements of the new philosophy. When, at the turn of the eight. In the intellectual atmosphere of this approaching triumph, the first attempts were made to extend the new way of thinking to the social world and to discover the natural laws of social intercourse which, in both their rationality and universality, would correspond to the laws of physics.
Man was no longer considered exempt from the subjection to the rational laws which determine the physical world. POWER POLITI OS governs man and nature alike and, by learning tl understand those laws, man will not only be able to guide the physical world to his needs but also to mould his destiny intelhgcntly and to become the master of his fate. Thorndike recently, "has shown that man has the possibility of almost complete control of his fate, and that if he fails it.
Hooker had already anticipated this development, in so far as the peIception of the laws of nature is concerned, by. Thus, he took the decisive step from the concept of a theological world, whose divine government is above human understanding as well as action, to the concept of an inherently rational world of which man is a part and which he can understand and act upon.
Starting with the same philosophical premises, Hobbes created the picture of a social world which is subject to the same mechanical laws which govern physical nature and, hence, to the same iron necessity of the causal law. O the rationally right,l Due to the same misconception of foreign affairs, the liberal statesmen of weste,rn Europe were intellectually and morally unable to resist German expansion as long as it appeared to be justified -as in the cases of Austria and the Sudetenland-by the holy principles of national unification.
Since these were the very same principles, eternally true and univeroally valid, in which the liberal statesmen believed and for which their predecessors had fought, they did not see how they could well oppose them when others invoked them in their own behalf. Some of our leftists and other politicians are Anglophile today and they were Germanophile yesterday, exclusively according to the political party or group being in power in Berlin or London.
Thus, Germany no longer interests some of our socialists since she has fallen into the hands of the junkers and generals. Yet, let tomorrow the socialist Hermann Mueller return to power and Leon Blum will be moved again and again by the German tragedy. How could they make an alliance with a dictatorship like Russia?
They wOldd fight for democracy, yes. And was not Pilsudski Poland one of the worst dictatorships on earth? They even felt duty-bound to lend active support to foreign interests when-as in the case of the so-called "injustices of Versailles" -the principles of liberal nationalism could be invoked in their behalf.
Logical deductions from abstract rational principles replaced in the liberal era the pragmatic decision of political issues according to the increase or decrease in political power to be expected. Political weapons were transformed into absolute truths.
In its abstract formalism it does not see that democracy, as any other political system, functions only under certain intellectual, moral, and social conditlons and that the unqualified principle of majority makes democracy defenceless against its enemies, who will use the democratic processes in order to destroy ithem.
Freedom of the ipress, origmating as a political weapon against. When the Spanish Republic attempted, a hundred years late, to realize some of the liberal reforms against the opposition of a feudalistic minority, the philosopher Ortega y Gasset could invoke the abstract principle of the common good and exclaim: "The Republic e ists for everybody.
It was the same confusion between political aim and rational truth which prevented the liberal from opposing political aims in the international field when liberal principles were invoked in their support and, on the other hand, from! Oonversely, the German and especially the Prussian conservatives, during the first decades of the German Empire, supported a foreign policy friendly to Russia because Russia was the mosl conservative of the Great Powers, whereas the Gelman liberals during the same petiod favoured an Anglophile foreign policy, for Great Britain was then the symbol of a parliamentary monarchy.
Throughout the nineteenth century, American, British, and German liberals were deeply attached to the cause of Italian, Hungarian, and Polish nationalism. Poland is their , external' thermometer. Under the ministry of Oasimir Peder, in rSgI, a revolt broke out in Paris because the government did not give assistance to the Polish insurgents. After r, France was swayed by a wave of enthusiasm in favour of the Hungarian patriots.
Michelet proclaimed as the mission of France "the deliverance of the other nations," and he, as well as Victor Hugo and George Sand, dreamed of establishing a universal republic through national revolutions. I do not think I am responsible for seeing right and truth and justice carried out all over the world. In the United States, however, the tradition of nonintervention, supported by the technical difficulties of effective intervention, during the nineteenth century prevented popular sympathies from being translated into political action.
On April 13, , Danton opposed the execution of the decree of November 18, , quoted above, by showing that it could not be the business of France "to bring aid to some patriots who would want to make a revolution in China. As for England, the Congress of Berlin had already settled the oriental qu.
Thus, in happy contrast to the 's and 'S, the liberal fallacy did not then influence actual foreign policy. In Germany, Bismarck knew what foreign policy was about and did not sacrifice Russia's friendship to Polish nationalism.
The Treaty of the Triple Alliance of stated that its aim was" to fortify the monarchical principles and thereby to reassure the unimpaired maintenance of the social and political order in their respective states.
Bismarck's distrust of England's foreign policy as dependent upon parliamentary consent anticipated the anti-British direction of the foreign policy of Wilhelm II, under whose regime the monarchical and antidemocratic ideology became a determining factor in foreign affairs.
The German foreign policy of this period is another example of the all-permeating influence of the liberal fallacy. Its victims are not only the liberal parties, properly speaking, but political groups of all denominations, whose political imtincts are no longer strong. The foreign policy of Wilhelm II simply exchanged the frock coat of the liberal merchant for the mummeries of monarchical romanticism and the rational language of Manchester liberalism for the Wagnerian bombast of a decadent divine.
The essence of the approach to foreign affairs was the same. Here and there, a foreign policy based upon an unpolitical principle of association brought upon its protagonists the same disastrous results.
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